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However, a different conclusion was reached in the High7 o
Court in Ireland in Allan &_ Hanbury Ltd v Comptroller of Patents 
Designs and Trademarks (1997) Fleet Street Reports, where the 
grant of a compulsory licence of a patent was overturned 
because it conflicted with the TRIPS Agreement.
There is therefore a conflicting situation where different 
member states at the first level of the court hierarchy have taken 
diametrically opposed views. It will need appeals to the higher 
courts such as the House of Lords for the matter to be resolved.
CONCLUSION
What conclusions can one derive from all this? First, there 
is absolutely no doubt that the new WTO dispute settlement 
system is a success, as is witnessed by the flood of cases that have 
been presented by member states since the introduction of the 
system in February 1996. Indeed, the WTO is a victim of its 
own success, in so far as it is not able to cope with its huge new 
workload.
The European Commission is actively trying to promote the 
interest of Community industry by bringing complaints to the 
WTO. No doubt a similar attitude is expressed by the Japanese 
authorities. However, as discussed above, a Japanese company 
with substantial production facility within the ELI will be treated 
as a Community producer and should be able to use the new 
trade barriers regulation as much as normal Community 
producers.
Secondly, that the recent cases before the ECJ indicate that, 
in an appropriate case, the court may well depart from its past
practice in the 1947 GATT and allow individuals and private 
companies to enforce the WTO agreements directly against 
member states which have breached their obligations. This 
would be a tremendous weapon to use in opening up markets 
and in ensuring that industry obtains full benefits from the new 
WTO agreements.
Thirdly, despite the conflicting results of the cases that have 
so far occurred before the national courts of the member states, 
there appears to be a growing willingness by those courts to 
accept arguments based on international law and the WTO 
agreements. There will sooner or later be a reference to ECJ 
from a national court of a member state which will further 
clarify the extent to which individuals can raise the WTO 
agreements in a national court.
By way of conclusion, I would suggest that when Japanese 
exporters are faced with trade barriers within the Community 
legal system or practices by the European Commission in, for 
example, the application of anti-dumping rules, it should look 
at the possibility of using the WTO agreements as a further 
weapon. After all, the WTO agreements   and the courts which 
are there to give effect to them   were supposed to create a new 
climate for international trade and both Europeans and Japanese 
are supposed to benefit from this. ®
Philip Ruttley
Garretts
This text was originally delivered at a seminar with the Japanese 
Machinery Exporters' Association, held in Tokyo on 11 July 1997
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Recent years have seen a developing picture in the law relating to trade marks. 
Paul Harris and Paul Garland review decisions made under the Trade Marks Act 
1994 and look at a number of passing off cases.
W e have now had just over two years of the new substantive and procedural approaches to trade marks and whilst there have been a few surprises, 
from the litigation point of view, it would generally be fair to say 
that there has been a lot 'more of the same'.
Passing off actions, too, have slowly been evolving and the last 
two years' important cases are digested below.
TRADE MARK REGISTRY PRACTICE
The case of Konings Graanstrokrij (NV) 's Application — St Trudo 
Trade Mark [1995] FSR 345, though not heard in the registry,
related to Trade Mark Registry practice. Konings Graanstrokrij 
NV applied to expunge two marks for St Trudo in Classes 32 
and 33 registered in the name of McCormick (UK) pic. The 
application was dealt with on the basis of the transitional 
provisions of the Trade Marks Act 1994.The application succeeded 
and the concurrent jurisdiction of the registrar and the court 
was preserved and noted.
However, the main point of this case, which gave rise to great 
concern amongst trade mark agents at the time was that Mro to
Justice Ferris held that second-hand or more remote hearsay 
evidence was inadmissible in rectification proceedings; the strict
10
rules of evidence under the Civil Evidence Act 1968 would admit 
first-hand hearsay evidence only in certain circumstances. 
Following this decision, the patent officer should take direction 
on the admissibility of evidence in proceedings under, inter alia, 
the 1994 statute.
Clearly it is correct that the same rules of evidence have to 
apply, particularly as trade mark matters frequently end up being 
heard finally in court and it would, for example, be irrational for 
one set of rules to apply in the registry and another set to apply- 
on appeal.
In Nabisco v Nestle — Lifesavers (unreported, 17 December 
1996), which involved both opposition and revocation 
proceedings, the first formally argued application for discovery 
in the Trade Marks Registry was made. The request was made 
for documents referred to in the statutory declaration sworn on 
behalf of Nestle, claiming use of a two-dimensional 
representation of a ring with Polo, Polo around it. Surrounding 
documents, showing the decision to use the mark were sought, 
together with copies of assignments and licences referred to in 
statutory declarations and statements made in the opposition 
proceedings.
So far as the application for discovery was concerned, the 
registry decreed that it did not have to follow the detailed 
procedural rules of the High Court and that things should be 
kept simpler.
INFRINGEMENT CASES
The following cases all concern infringement actions and 
highlight the approach under the Trade Marks Act 1994.
It is useful to bear in mind the approach taken previously under 
the Trade Marks Act 1938. Essentially, under the old statute, when 
a court considered infringement, it compared the two marks 
and considered whether they were confusingly similar. What was 
sought was confusion as to source or origin of the goods. It was
o o o
enough that the similarity of the marks would make a customer 
believe that the alleged infringer's goods were associated with
o o o
the proprietor's own business or his goods.
Origins Natural Resources Inc v Origin Clothing [1995] FSR 280 
was the first case to consider the Trade Marks Act 1994. The 
judge, Robin Jacob, reiterated that the comparison was still 
'mark for mark', as under the 1938 Act, (although he 
subsequently corrected himself and said, 'mark for a sign'). One 
important issue raised by the judge (which again reflects 1938 
Act thinking) was that, where the mark infringed had not been 
used, the comparison must take into consideration normal and 
fair use by the proprietor.
SIMILARITY
The case of British Sugar pic v James Robertson &^Sons Ltd [ 1996] 
RFC 281 considered the test for 'similarity' between goods or 
services. The judge followed the earlier Origins case of 'mark for 
sign' comparison and concluded that the marks   Treat — were 
identical. He then went on to assess whether the goods were 
identical (in which case there was infringement under s. 10(1)), 
whether they were similar (in which case s. 10(2) applied) or 
wholly dissimilar (in which case s. 10(3) would apply). The 
judge looked at the classification of goods and concluded that 
the different uses to which the goods were primarily put would 
place them in different classes. British Sugar's registration in 
Class 30 was for dessert sauces and syrups, whereas the
defendants claimed their product was aimed at a different 
market, equating it more to peanut butter and other spreads, 
which would fall in Class 29.
More importantly the judge had to decide what the overall 
test was for 'similarity of goods' (the classification element being 
just one part). In arriving at a suitable test the judge said:
7 think the sort of considerations the court must have in mind are 
similar to those arising under the old Act in relation to goods of the same 
description. I do not say this because I believe that there is any intention 
to take over that conception directly. There plainly is not. '
Notwithstanding this, the judge then went on to apply the old 
Jellinek case test (Jellinek's Application (1946) 63 RFC 59) and 
looked at:
  the respective uses of the respective goods;
  the respective users of the respective goods;
  the physical nature of the goods/services; and
  the respective trade channels through which the goods 
reached the market.
The judge, however, updated the test and added two further 
criteria to reflect modern marketing and purchasing 
methodology:
1. In the case of self-serve consumer items, there is the 
question of where the goods are likely to be found in the 
supermarket, particularly on which shelves.
2. The extent of the goods' competitiveness must be 
considered.
In considering this question the way in which market research 
companies classify the goods may be taken into account.
So, in relation to the approach which looks at the similarity of 
goods, the test laid down by the court in this case means that 
there is very little change from the methods used under the
J O
1938 Act.
On the basis of the test that he had set out, the judge 
concluded that the goods were not similar and in any event there 
was no likelihood of confusion. Moreover, he found that the 
defendant had a defence under s. 11(2) and that British Sugar 
did not have a valid registration for Treat. The judge considered 
that, notwithstanding the amount of use, the goods were also 
sold under the house mark Silver Spoon and therefore Treat was 
not really a badge of origin in its own right. Moreover, it was one 
of those common laudatory words, simply incapable of 
distinguishing one product from another.
CONFUSION
However one must look to the last part of the test under s. 
10(2) in order to appreciate the approach. Having compared 
the mark with the sign and against the background of the 
similarity of the goods or services, one must then assess whether 
there is a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. This 
includes the likelihood of association with the trade mark.
The issue of likelihood of confusion was analysed by Mr 
Justice Laddie in Wagamama Ltd v City Centre Restaurants pic 8/^Anor 
[1995] FSR 713. The plaintiff had a registration for Wagamama 
for restaurant services. A restaurant under that name had been 
in business since April 1992 at a site near the British Museum. 
In April 1995 the plaintiff became aware that the defendants 
were intending to open an Indian-themed restaurant under the
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mark Rajamama and interlocutory proceedings were instigated. 
In fact, speedy trial was agreed and the trial came before Mr 
Justice Laddie within three months of the action being 
commenced.
The essential part of this case was what was meant by 
'likelihood of association'. As this was not a concept known to 
the UK, the court was urged to look at Benelux law, from where 
this concept was alleged to have come.
Essentially, the Benelux law concept is encapsulated in the test 
as to whether or not the registered trade mark would be called 
to mind on seeing the alleged infringing sign. Mr Justice Laddie 
designated that to be 'non-origin association'. He considered 
that to expand trade mark rights in accordance with Benelux law 
would significantly restrict the freedom of traders to compete; 
he was not prepared to agree to a 'new millstone around the 
neck of traders', in the absence of clear and unambiguous 
language in the trade marks directive. The plaintiff succeeded by 
showing confusion as to origin   following, therefore, the test 
previously used under the old 1938 Act   and also passing off.
UNFAIR ADVANTAGE
In BASF pic and BASF AG v CEP (UK) pic (unreported, 1996), 
BASF were the registered proprietors of the mark Opus for 
pesticides, herbicides and similar goods. CEP had for ten years 
published a directory under the name Opus. Planning to launch 
a free directory of farming suppliers called Farming Opus, CEP 
contacted BASF as a potential advertiser. BASF asked CEP to 
change its name which CEP refused to do. An interlocutory 
injunction was subsequently sought to restrain CEP from 
passing off and trade mark infringement.
The court dismissed BASF's application for an injunction. 
The court held that survey evidence of confusion amongstJ o
farmers was deemed insufficient to show passing off. The fact 
that there was an overlap between the plaintiffs' products and 
the subject matter of the defendants' publication did not 
establish a likelihood of confusion.
Trade mark infringement was considered under s. 10(3) of 
the Act as the goods in question were not similar. The court held 
that there was no evidence that CEP was taking unfair advantage 
of BASF's mark. The court added that where there is no 
confusion amongst the relevant members of the public, then the 
distinctive character of the plaintiff's mark cannot be adversely 
affected. It appears that this case limits the scope of s. 10(3) as 
the court stated that, without evidence of confusion, there can 
be no detrimental advantage taken nor detriment caused.
BAYWATCH CASE
In Baywatch Productions Co Inc v The Home Video Channel [1997] 
FSR 22, the plaintiff, producer of the television series Baywatch 
and the registered proprietor of the mark Baywatch (in Class 9, 
for videos), sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the 
defendant from broadcasting the sexually explicit Babewatch 
series until trial of the substantive issues.
The plaintiff was seeking to rely on three causes of action, 
namely trade mark infringement under s. 10(2), under s. 
10(3) and passing off.
The judge, Mr Crystal QC, concluded that the plaintiff had 
failed to demonstrate that there was a serious question to be 
tried. The court also held that adult television programmes and
video tapes, etc. were not similar goods or services within the 
definition of s. 10.
In relation to s. 10(3) the judge followed BASF and took the 
view that this section did require confusion, as it would be 
illogical for s. 10(3) to give greater protection in relation to non- 
similar goods or services by dispensing with the ingredient of 
the likelihood of confusion, than the protection afforded to 
similar goods under s. 10(2). The court adjudged that there was 
no evidence to support an arguable case of likelihood of 
confusion (under s. 10(2) or s. 10(3)).
This decision has been much criticised as it seems that the 
courts are interpreting s. 10(3) in such a way as to prevent its 
use as an anti-dilution weapon. A trade mark owner can find the 
mark's distinctiveness being blurred, or its reputation damaged 
by an association with poor quality goods, despite the absence of 
customer confusion.
PICK UP A PUFFIN
In the recent case of United Biscuits (UK) Ltd v Asda Stores Ltd 
(unreported, 18 March 1997), United Biscuits, the 
manufacturer of Penguin, the established brand leader for 
chocolate-coated sandwich biscuits, sought an injunction for 
passing off and trade mark infringement against Asda who 
launched its own competing brand entitled Puffin. The Puffin 
brand was launched in September 1996 and sold in Asda 
supermarkets in close juxtaposition to Penguin biscuits. The 
slogan, 'Pick up a Puffin' was used in a feature on new products 
in Asda's leaflet What's New, but its use was stopped following 
objections by United Biscuits.
The court held that the sale of Asda's Puffin biscuits amounted 
to passing off. To show passing off, United Biscuits had to 
establish the classic trinity of reputation, misrepresentation and 
damage.
Having shown goodwill and damage, United Biscuits 
demonstrated that the name Puffin and the prominent picture of 
an upright dark-coloured bird with a white front gave the 
expectation, on first impression, that an association would be 
made between the Asda product and that of United Biscuits. It 
was sufficient if a substantial part of the general public were led 
to suppose, or assume or guess at such a connection. Despite the 
fact that the great majority of customers did not know who was 
the manufacturer of Penguins, the Puffin packaging and get-up 
was held to be deceptively similar to those of Penguin. The 
customer did not need to know the name of the manufacturer 
who owned the goodwill, provided that the customer knew that 
there was such a person and cared that the goods which he 
bought were made by that person.
However, the claim for infringement of the plaintiff's word 
mark Penguin failed. The judge held that he did not consider the 
fair use was infringed by the use of the sign Puffin, 'once added 
surrounding matter is disregarded'. The court also held that four 
of the pictorial marks registered by United Biscuits should be 
revoked. United Biscuits did not have a registration of the 
Penguin device used on its current pack and the court held that 
there was no infringement in relation to those registered 
pictorial marks which escaped revocation.
An injunction was granted to restrain Asda from selling Puffins 
in the current get-up or in any get-up which would amount to 





Until the 1994 Act, use of a registered trade mark in a 
comparative advertisement was not permitted. However, under 
s. 10(6) of the 1994 Act, a trade mark can be used to identify 
another's goods, as long as it is in accordance with honest
o ' o
practices in industrial and commercial matters and does not, 
without due cause, take unfair advantage of or is not detrimental 
to the distinctive character or repute of the mark.
There were a number of cases under the 1938 Act including 
Compaq Computers Corp v Dell Computer Corpn [1992] FSR 93 
where Dell was injuncted from using Compaq's trade mark.
The comparative advertising provision of s. 10(6) is not 
something within the trade marks directive and therefore the 
law across Europe continues to be diverse. For example, in 
Germany you can't even say, 'Avis   we try harder' or 'probably 
the best lager in the world'.
UK DECISION
The first UK decision was Barclays Bank pic v RBS Advanta 
[1996] RFC 307. Barclays applied for an immediate injunction 
claiming trade mark infringement against the defendants: RBS 
Advanta were a joint venture between Royal Bank of Scotland 
pic and the American Advanta Corp. relating to advertising 
literature about the RBS Advanta Visa Card. Three documents 
were sent out together: a letter, a leaflet and a brochure. The 
leaflet set out the benefits offered by the defendants' card and 
the brochure contained a table comparing the defendants' Visa 
card with those of the plaintiffs and other banks. The 
comparison was limited to the annual fee and interest rate.
Barclays sought an injunction under s. 10(6) of the Act:
'the literature did not accord with honest practices in industrial and 
commercial matters'
as it did not compare like with like. All the benefits were not 
spelled out. It was claimed that it took unfair advantage of 
Barclays' mark.
Mr Justice Laddie held that the primary object of s. 10(6) was 
to allow comparative advertising, with the proviso that the use of 
a competitor's mark was in accordance with honest practices in 
industrial and commercial matters. He noted that:
(1) The onus was on the registered proprietor to show that the 
facts as indicated in the proviso did not exist.
(2) There would be no infringement unless the use was not in 
accordance with honest practices and this should be judged 
by members of a reasonable audience.
(3) For the use to come within the proviso it must be other than 
in accordance with honest practices in industrial and 
commercial matters. The nature of the products or services 
would affect the degree of hyperbole or puff acceptable. He 
felt that the final part of the proviso concerning unfair 
advantage and detriment added nothing of significance to 
the first part.
It was also held that Barclays' case was very weak on the point 
about comparing like with like. He did not think that the 
omission of some of Barclaycard's benefits would be regarded by 
a reasonable reader as dishonest. He felt that, in view of the 
comparative triviality of the benefit the plaintiff would obtain 
from the grant of the injunction and the small amount of 
damage which, in the light of other competitive advertising, it 
would suffer, it was inappropriate to grant an injunction. He
did, however, criticise the drafting of the section as 'a mess'.
In this case, although the point to point comparison was not 
completely precise, it was not sufficiently inaccurate to create a 
dishonest impression. Therefore, newcomers might well slightly 
mislead the public, but not mislead them enough.
When the Act was first being reviewed issues arose as to 
whether industry standards should be taken into account; at that 
time it was generally felt that this would not be the case. Mr 
Justice Laddie appears also to have taken this view, although it is 
fair to say that if an industry standard was not adhered to, then 
that might well be thought to be dishonest.
VODAFONE CASE
The second comparative advertising case, Vodafone Group pic <&_ 
Vodafone Ltd v Orange Personal Communication Services Ltd (The Times, 
31 August 1996) was heard by Mr Justice Jacob.
Orange launched an advertising campaign in late October 
1995. This included the slogan 'On average Orange users save 
£20 every month'. The saving was expressly stated to be in 
comparison to Vodafone or Cellnet's equivalent tariffs. Vodafone 
considered the slogan to be false; it sued in both malicious
o
falsehood and as an infringement of its registered trade mark
o o
Vodafone, which was admittedly valid and covered the services 
offered by Orange.
Orange argued that, even if the slogan were misleading, it did 
nothing to the distinctive character of the mark Vodafone. Mr 
Justice Jacob considered this to be incorrect. He stated that the 
slogan clearly took advantage of the distinctive character or 
repute of the mark as it would have been meaningless if no-one 
had heard of Vodafone. He commented that, if the slogan was 
misleading, there was infringement. He ruled that the ordinary 
man would have considered the advertisement to have meant 
that the running costs on Orange were below those on 
Vodafone. The ordinary man would not have considered the 
advertisement to have been a promise that he would have saved 
£20 himself. He would have been aware that the average would 
be affected by 'those people who seem to do nothing else but be 
on their mobile phones'.
Vodafone argued further that the advertisement also said that 
on average Vodafone users would save £20 for the month if they 
had instead been on Orange. This was dismissed on the basis 
that the:
'single meaning Jbr the purposes of malicious falsehood is that if the 
users on Orange had been on Vodafone or Cellnet with the same usage as 
they had made on Orange, on arithmetic average they would have had to 
pay £20 more a month'.
Vodafone's case on malice was dismissed as hopeless. The 
claim of falsehood failed because Mr Justice Jacob rejected, as 
irrelevant, Vodafone's argument that the statement had been 
made to a market in which customers were generally confused. 
The public would recognise that the statement had been about 
average costs and that different tariffs were included.
The advertisement had made it clear that the comparison was 
for equivalent tariffs and, accordingly, leaving out some specific 
Vodafone tariffs did not go to show falsity. Malice was not proved 
nor was it established that the advertisement was misleading. 
Accordingly the claim in trade mark infringement also failed.
Whatever the decisions are under s. 10(6) in the UK, this 
does not overcome the problem of advertising in a European
market where the advertiser has to take into account the lowest 
common denominator.
PASSING OFF
Comparative advertising was also involved in the case of 
Kimberly-Clarke Ltd v Fort Sterling Ltd (The Times, 3 1 August 1996). 
The defendant, in launching a new toilet paper called Nouvelle 
Quilted, referred to the toilet paper brand leader Andrex as part of 
its promotion, which was designed to emphasise the softness of 
its new product. Part of the promotion was an on-pack offer to 
customers that, if they were not satisfied with Nouvelle Quilted, 
they could claim an equivalent sized pack of Andrex in 
substitution. The packaging stated 'softness guaranteed (or we'll 
exchange it for Andrex)\ The packaging in very small type 
acknowledged that 'Andrex is a registered trade mark of [the 
plaintiff]'.
The plaintiff launched an application for interlocutory relief; by 
agreement, this application was treated as the main passing off 
action.
Again, the plaintiff had to establish goodwill, misrepresentation 
and damage. The court considered the analysis of the relevant
o J
market and held that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's mark 
in its promotion was likely to lead to a substantial number of 
consumers believing that Nouvelle Quilted was associated with the 
plaintiff. Given this likelihood of deception, the plaintiff was 
likely to lose sales. Accordingly the plaintiff's passing off action 
succeeded. ©
Paul Garland and Paul Harris
Eversheds (London)
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